Tab A

COMMENTS ON SPECIFIC EXAMPLES OF PROPAGANDA ANALYSIS

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version to the "destruction of capitalism" formula, after his previous reference to the destruction of world civilization, to "party pressure." This analysis stated that a political lecture of 12 April anticipated Malenkov's change of line and a Khrushchev speech confirmed it.

found evidence of an effort to counteract the effects of Malenkov's "indiscretion" in his later speech, which contrasted the calm confidence of the Soviet people with American anxiety, and in the heavy play on the Soviet rebuff of Hitler or any new foe in

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OCI does not share this interpretation. We particularly question the implication that Malenkov was forced to reverse himself because of pressure from other members of the ruling group.

the Khrushchev and Mikoyan speeches.

25X1A 25X1A stated that Chou En-lai's failure to mention Pakistan along with other states whose presence at Geneva would be "very valuable", and Molotov's subsequent inclusion of Pakistan, "may reflect a slight divergence of views."

OCT has no reason to believe that this omission had any significance as an indication of Sino-Soviet differences on this issue.

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analyses found indications of Sino-Soviet differences with regard to an Asian security pact. Seemed to suggest that, while Hoscow preferred a formal pact, Peiping had in mind only an informal understanding and cooperation in cultural and economic fields.

OCI feels that it is not yet clear whether Moscow and Peiping envisage a formal pact or not, but there is no apparent divergence on the question of Asian security. In his opening speech at Geneva, Molotov fully endorsed Chou En-lai's previous statement that "the countries of Asia should consult among themselves with a view to seeking common measures to safeguard peace and security in Asia, by means of respective mutual obligations."

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4. Conclusions in the report on the recent session of the USSR Supreme Soviet, based on propaganda analysis, do not agree with OCI views. OCI fears that wide distribution of such a report stimulates excessive speculation, and, by leaving some readers with unwarranted conclusions, increases the confusion and uncertainty which already exists concerning the internal Soviet political situation. Some specific examples follow:

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a. In considering Malenkov's status, we find saying that "his decline in stature is evident," and "it seems likely that Malenkov was directed to make....statements in the name of the Central Committee." Even more questionable is the statement that "there is an evident de-emphasis of the consumer goods program." Yet despite these statements, the report reaches the conclusion that the recent meeting "was less significant" than the August 1953 session. We believe that generalized appraisals of the Soviet leadership problem are not justified on the basis of two propaganda speeches. We hold that no estimation of the Soviet consumer goods policy can be made from these two brief statements.

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- b. OCI believes that analysis of the difference in approach between Malenkov and Khrushchev on the government reorganisation is greatly exaggerated. Attempting to show personal rivalry by contrasting Malenkov's statement, "we became convinced", with Khrushchev's "experience has shown," and characterizing this as "sectoric verbal sperring" between these two men represents, in OCI's opinion, unsound analysis.
- statement on one occasion that is not repeated again does not seem to be evidence that Malenkov "was required to modify his position," or that the Army leaders seemed to play a role in this change. Actually, the two Malenkov statements on the effects of another war are not contradictory, and analysis of this event as a "Malenkov retreat" does not appear substantiated.

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